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The role of the third participant is to disagree. While I have. no desire whatever to encourage interstate regulation of abortion, the territorialist sol~tions that my colleagues have chosen in order to isolate state abortion regulation pose other dangers.
Both Professor Brilmayer and Professor Kreimer argue not only that a state may make abortion legal within its borders, but also that the federal Constitution requires all other states to treat as lawful any abortion performed in such a prochoice state. Kreimer's right-totravel analysis appears to endorse the use of state borders as a means for evading relational duties. Brilmayer's analysis, grounded more in the prerogatives of territorial states than in the rights of mobile individuals, gives the state where an act occurs power to make preemptive grants of autonomy that override relational duties imposed by other states. In my view, these analyses overemphasize location and underemphasize relationship as a basis for legal obligation.
This 2. As Justice Blackmun recognized in Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55, the Supreme Court's holding was preceded by state constitutional holdings that favored abortion rights in People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. 1969 ) (decided on both state and federal due process grounds), cert denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) , and State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 435-36 (Fla. 1972 ) (state due process holding only). For post-Roe state constitutional activity on the subject of abortion, see, for example, ARK. CoNST. amend. LXVIII, § 2 ("The policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the Federal Constitution."); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding thereof."); CommitteeTo Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 798-99 (Cal. 1981) [Vol. 91:939 might then replicate the comparativists' current juxtaposition between the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions of Germany and Ireland. In some states, prohibition of abortion would be constitutionally required, while other states would give constitutional recognition to a woman's right to choose. Federal preemption principles and federal rights doctrines do not ordinarily distinguish between state statutes and state constitutional provisions as objects of federal displacement. That Brilmayer and Kreimer offer no separate analysis of such a variation on their hypotheticals is therefore understandable. But I hope to show that this . variation underlines some of the troubling aspects of territorialism, and particularly of Brilmayer's proposals concerning preemptive grants of autonomy.
Consider first the following, concededly strained, hypothetical: The Utah constitution recognizes a "right to life" for all fetuses conceived within the state by resident parents and requires the state to use all available means to protect them from abortion. The California constitution recognizes a woman's right to reproductive autonomy, including termination of pregnancy, and encourages (but does not require) public officials to facilitate that right. While attending an academic convention in California, the Dean of a Utah state university meets one of his professors, who tells him that she has just traveled to California to have an abortion. Rather than dissuade the professor or report the imminent abortion to other Utah authorities, the Dean accompanies the professor to the clinic and helps her to pass through a crowd of antiabortion demonstrators who are picketing there. Upon return to Utah, is the Dean subject to discipline, or is Utah required to recognize the abortion, the assistance, and the complicit silence as lawful because of California's superior authority over all persons within its territory?
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS Federal constitutional arguments in a post-Roe world would be affected by the particular reasons that the Supreme Court gave for overruling Roe. If the Court concluded that states had a compelling interest in potential life from the moment of conception, 3 then this Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 397 (Mass. 1981) (holding that exclusion of medically necessary abortions from Medicaid coverage violated state due process guarantee); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 928, 933-37 (N.J. 1982 ) (holding that exclusion of medically necessary abortions from Medicaid coverage violated state equal protection guarantee in conjunction with state constitutional right to privacy). interest could outweigh other constitutional rights like the right to travel. If the Court recognized fetuses as "persons" for some or all purposes, then a post-Roe analysis would vary accordingly. On the other hand, if the reversal rested solely on positivist arguments from "original intent" or history that circumscribed a right to abortion as outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 but said no more, then the federalism implications of abortion regulation would require closer examination.
Without Roe v. Wade, a positivist would likely find nothing in the Constitution to preclude a state from recognizing a fetus present within its borders as the object of legal duties. To speak of the fetus' domicile, and make the common domicile a basis for regulation of the woman's relationship with the fetus, might then make sense. Similarly, without Roe, a state would have greater discretion to confer legal rights on the biological father in his relationship with the woman and the fetus. The Court's condemnation of a spousal veto in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 5 might not survive once the Court had withdrawn recognition from the woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.
I will not stress the criminalization of abortion, which Kreimer emphasizes, but rather civil regulation. I will look to situations where, for example, the biological father of the fetus might sue in the state of common domicile to enjoin the woman from leaving the state for the purpose of having an abortion or to enjoin the imminent abortion once she has left the state. 6 The biological father might be suing to enforce his own state-conferred rights, or on behalf of the fetus, which shares the common domicile. Questions of legality in the civil sense are more common in conflicts between state constitutions. Kreimer's arguments draw on a tradition of distinctive concern with extraterritorial criminal laws in the interstate context. If the Federal Constitution places stricter limits on state criminal jurisdiction than on civil regulation, this may result from the history of criminal procedure at common law rather than from generally valid principles about the regulatory structure of federalism. 1 4. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 , 2874 (1992 S. 412 (1981) , by arguing that the domicile state cannot forbid its citizens to travel interstate for the purpose of committing an act that it cannot make an extraterritorial crime, are weakened to the extent that [Vol. 91:939 Brilmayer's phrasing of the alternatives as a choice between prescriptive jurisdiction based on residence and prescriptive jurisdiction based on territory seems ill-suited to describe the subject of this colloquy. Jurisdiction based on residence also encompasses questions like whether a New York resident who becomes pregnant while attending law school in Palo Alto is subject to New York or California law. As Kreimer emphasizes, however, the socially important phenomenon is interstate travel for the purpose of abortion. We are talking about what the Germans call abortion tourism, 8 a brief departure from the state for the sole purpose of enjoying a less restrictive legal regime.
If we must make ascriptions of territorial situs, then we may best regard the reproductive autonomy of a New York resident attending school in California as, for the moment, situated in California. In contrast, when a woman spends her entire life in Pennsylvania except for one day spent in New Jersey for the sake of terminating a pregnancy, to regard her reproductive autonomy as situated in New Jersey may make less sense. The activities that cause us to place so high a value on reproductive autonomy, and the burdens that will result if reproductive autonomy is denied, including the resulting relationship with an unwanted child, are overwhelmingly situated in Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, let me concede arguendo that the territorial situs of a right to terminate pregnancy should always be identified with the state where the procedure is performed.
As Brilmayer emphasizes, we are living in the modem world, where federal constitutional law does not aspire to identify a unique state with the right to govern each transaction, and frequently different rules would apply in the courts of different states if the litigation were to occur there. 9 Congress could choose to adopt national conflicts rules, and it could indeed resolve the issue of interstate regulation of abortion by enforcing Brilmayer's proposal and compelling other states to respect "preemptive" laws of a situs state. do not believe, however, that the Constitution itself imposes Brilmayer's territorialist preemption rule.
A due process complaint based on uncertainty rings particularly hollow in the case of individuals who travel interstate for the sole purpose of avoiding duties to others arising under home state law. Various ana1ogies come to mind, and teachers of Conflicts can no doubt think of others.11 Some involve remova1 of children; 12 another involves a trustee who removes a trust asset in order to dispose of it in a state whose law of fiduciary duty is weaker; 13 and a more melodramatic example involves a custodian who removes a prisoner overseas for the purpose of defeating habeas corpus jurisdiction. 14
II. AN INTERNATIONAL ANALOGY, DISTINGUISHED
Professor Kreimer notes some European examples of intemationa1 travel for the purpose of escaping nationa1 restrictions on abortion. The German response, attempting enforcement against extraterritoria1 acts, reflects the concern that the state should not abdicate its constitutiona1 responsibility to restrict abortion by overlooking such travel. An American state might similarly. view its constitution as requiring its officia1s to prevent its citizens from traveling out of state to obtain abortions.
One method for confining the state's law to its own borders would be to deny that the state constitution can impose duties on its officia1s outside the state. This method recalls the arguments often made by federal officia1s in recent years that their actions outside U.S. borders were not controlled by the U.S. Constitution. The trend was accelerated by the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 15 that the Fourth Amendment did not constrain federa1 officia1s' search of a nonresident alien's home outside the United States. The government has a1so sent the Coast Guard onto the high seas to intercept Haitian refugees before they reach U.S. waters and argued that it could then process them outside the constraints of U.S. statutory and constitutiona1 law. Neither Kreimer nor Brilmayer, however, argues that the Constitution imposes a territorialist solution to international conflicts.17 Kreimer bases his argument on a morally pluralist federal union, with a stress on national unity. 18 Brilmayer argues that the Constitution gives priority to the state of territorial situs as a matter of interstate accommodation within federalism, but not that the Constitution compels a similar international comity. 19 Indeed, in the international context, there is a name (even mentioned in the Constitution) for giving the claims of territorial situs absolute priority over the claims of citizenship. The name is "treason. " 20 My colleagues' analyses do not make the formal error of giving conflicts rules hierarchical priority over constitutional law, nor do they support the claim that the U.S. Constitution is restricted to U.S. soil. Both of them seek homes within the federal Constitution for a mandatory rule resolving conflicts between the laws of two states in certain cases differently than international conflicts are resolved. Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of Verdugo-Urquidez and the dangerous claim that constitutions do not oblige a government's officials outside its borders. If we take state constitutionalism seriously, then it would be puzzling to conclude that the U.S. Constitution forbids extraterritorial effect for state constitutional rights while requiring extraterritorial effect for federal constitutional rights. sides of the border and conduct a search that is legal under California and federal law but violates the Oregon Constitution. Much of the case law and literature on interstate search-andseizure conflicts focuses on the remedial question of the exclusionary consequences, 22 which the manipulability of deterrence analysis has unduly complicated. 23 Instead, let us focus directly on the substantive question of the legality of the search: Does the federal Constitution prohibit Oregon courts from regarding the search as a violation of their state constitution because it was legal under California law?
For the Oregon court, the first question is one of constitutionalism, not conflict oflaws -whether the Oregon constitution limits the powers of state officials even when they act extraterritorially. Absent explicit language or "legislative history" of the state constitution, answering this question requires the court to examine some of the fundamental assumptions of constitutionalism as viewed in Oregon. The state constitution may, for example, rest on a natural rights philosophy that regards state constitutional rights as reflecting universal moral rights that may overlap with the federal constitutional rights. 24 It may hinge on a social contract theory that treats constitutional limitations as the preconditions for all exercises of the sovereign power granted to the state by its people in its constitution. 25 Either of these alternatives could make state constitutional rights presumptively applicable to Oregon officials when they exercise sovereign power outside Oregon's borders. 26 Both theories have deep roots in American constitutionalism. · Alternatively, Oregon might view its constitution in a skeptical, positivist light, as an organic statute for one territorial subunit among many in a federal system. An Oregon court might then conclude that rights outside its borders, even against actions of its own officials, are remitted for their protection to federal law and the laws of sister states, plus any extraterritorial legislation the Oregon legislature might Constitutional analysis trumps interest analysis (among other methodologies), and a state supreme court that is confident of the theory of rights underlying its constitution may have access to a binding source of insight on the reach of state law that is absent in most conflicts cases. 29 The Oregon court may still have to consider the question raised by Brilmayer's "preemption" analysis, however: Does afederal conflicts rule oust the Oregon constitution in this case? In other words, does territoriality trump the governance relationship established by Oregon between its own police and individuals subject to their authority, so that California may give the Oregon police powers, enforceable in the courts of their own state, that the Oregon constitution forbids? Now, the California law permitting the search may not yet "preempt" according to Brilmayer's standard, because it does not express an affirmative policy in favor of the police's autonomy to search. If the hypothetical requires supplementation, then let me add the assumption that the legality of the search under California law results from an amendment to the California Constitution that expressly trims back search-and-seizure rights in California to be no greater than federal search-and-seizure rights.Jo 27. See id. at 984-87 (stressing need for rights to legitimate state's exercise of power). 28. As I will emphasize, the Federal Constitution imposes some limits on a state's choice among models of constitutionalism. These derive from such sources as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican Form of Government Clause. I believe that the models discussed in the text are within the range of permissible choices.
29. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392, 393 (1980) . 30. Such an amendment was part of Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act" package adopted by initiative in 1990. However, the California Supreme Court invalidated this package of amendments on the ground that it amounted to a wholesale revision of the Cali· fornia Constitution, which could not be accomplished by initiative. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990 32. Brilmayer's discussion of the Rushdie affair seems to imply that, so long as Roe stands, for Germany to punish a German woman for having an abortion in the United States would "offend American constitutional law." Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 890-91. Certainly we would not extradite (because of the principle of double criminality), and we would not enforce German law ourselves, but I do not see how Roe would preclude Germany from punishing the woman if she returned voluntarily.
33. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (setting maximum lawful rates of interest); KY. CoNST. § 241 ("Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be recovered for such death, from the corporations and persons so causing the same."); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (finding no federal barrier to state court's recognition of state constitutional right of access to private shopping center for free speech and petition purposes); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966) (holding federal right to interstate travel secured against private interference). State constitutional rights that ran against the federal government would inherently raise federal preemption problems.
34. This is now explicitly stated in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). I should not cite this case without adding that a footnote in one of the dissents endorses the result for which my colleagues argue. See 113 S. Ct. at 792 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, if Roe were to be overruled, then "a woman's right to enter another State to obtain an abortion would deserve strong protection • . . . [T] he diversity among the States in their regulation of abortion procedures would magnify the importance of unimpeded access to out-ofstate facilities.").
[Vol. 91:939 would not be "Roe-like" if it ran against the world generally (including the woman's husband, her parents, her church, and her employer) and prohibited all retaliation against a woman who has an abortion.
Perhaps I am mistaken in this respect. As a Fourteenth Amendment holding, Roe v. Wade ran against all the states. Would a "Roelike" state law right run against the granting state and all its sister states? A recent search-and-seizure case from the actual state of Oregon gives equivocal support for this possibility. In State v. Davis, 35 the Supreme Court of Oregon expressed the view that, if the defendant's arrest by Mississippi police in Mississippi had violated the standards applicable under the Oregon equivalent of the Fourth Amendment, 36 then evidence resulting from the arrest could not be introduced in an Oregon prosecution. 37 The court insisted that "the government cannot obtain a criminal conviction through the use of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under that provision." 38 Furthermore, "[i]t does not matter where that evidence was obtained (in-state or out-of-state), or what governmental entity (local, state, federal, or out-of-state) obtained it; the constitutionally significant fact is that the Oregon government seeks to use the evidence in an Oregon criminal prosecution." 39 The last-quoted clause, however, suggests that the Oregon constitution did not really contain a legal "right" binding on Mississippi police, but rather that Oregon treats the exclusionary rule as a constitutional right at trial, like the right against introduction of coerced confessions. 40 The court's primary focus on the exclusionary rule has distracted it from being precise in its legal characterization of the conduct of the Mississippi police. The Oregon search-and-seizure clause might "secure" a preexisting moral right, but it legally secures that right against the Oregon government. The court's casual mention of federally obtained evidence strengthens this impression -under the Supremacy Clause, Oregon cannot impose more stringent regulation of arrests on federal officers over federal objection, although it 35. 834 P.2d 1008 35. 834 P.2d (Or. 1992 . 36. OR. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.").
37. See 834 P.2d at 1011-13. The court deemed it necessary to decide whether Oregon constitutional standards applied before evaluating the constitutionality of the arrest.
38 need not accept the evidence they proffer. 41 Thus, at second glance, the analysis returns to the proposition that the Oregon constitution binds Oregon courts and prosecutors, giving the search-and-seizure provision unusually broad scope but remaining consistent with the phenomenon that states normally constitute themselves. · Let us assume, however, that Californians are so upset by crime that they want to permit police agents of any government to be free to search and seize on California soil to the maximum degree permitted by the federal Constitution. Do federalism principles prevent Oregon from imposing stricter standards on its own police, even when they operate in California? Do the structural assumptions of U.S. federalism give such priority to territoriality that they require that California law can free Oregon officials from all state constitutional constraints when they travel into California on official business?
Surely not. The federal Constitution makes only one reference to state constitutions, in the Supremacy Clause, which expresses the assumption that states will have constitutions and that the judges of the states will apply them. 42 The Constitution also assumes that states will have their own citizens. Article I assumes that states have elected legislatures, and Article IV requires that each state have a republican form of government. Popular sovereignty at the state level means that the people of the state confer powers on their own government. Although the supremacy of federal law sometimes enables the larger populace of the nation to augment those powers, the federal Constitution evidences no intention to give sister states equal authority to augment the powers of a state in a manner binding in its own courts. As the Supreme Court explained in Nevada v. Ha/l 4 3 upholding California's power to make Nevada subject to damage liability in California courts for torts committed in California:
In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed. The people of Nevada have consented to a system in which 41. See, e.g., State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315 , 1324 -30 (N.J. 1989 [Absent the Supremacy Clause,] as the constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it might happen that a treaty or national law of great and equal importance to the States would interfere with some and not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States at the same time that it would have no effect in others.
Id. at 132.
43. 440 U.S. 410 (1979) . [Vol. 91:939 their State is subject only to limited liability in tort. But the people of California, who have had no voice in Nevada's decision, have adopted a different system. Each of these decisions is equally entitled to our respect. 44 Thus, the fundamental assumption of U.S. federalism that the states are territorial units 45 must be limited by the fundamental assumption of U.S. federalism that states are themselves constitutional systems. The latter assumption prevents a state from making effective grants of "autonomy" to officials of another state, enforceable in the courts of their own state, despite the territorial "preemption" analysis that Brilmayer suggests. 46 To return to the abortion hypothetical with which I began, the "preemption" analysis would equally fail to override the Utah right to life. The federal Constitution would not require Utah to respect California's effort to confer on the Utah Dean autonomy to facilitate an abortion for a Utah employee while they were both in California. The presence of the Dean, the professor, and the fetus in California does not empower California to "preempt" the Dean's duties toward the fetus under Utah law.
IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
All the foregoing might be dismissed on the ground that state officials are not private citizens and that the priority of territoriality over residence of private citizens is consistent with a more deferential accommodation of territoriality and state constitutionalism. 47 True. But my point is that the "preemption" analysis gives excessive attention to the power of territorial states based on the location of particu- REv. 249, 315-20 (1992) . Professor Laycock, however, interprets territoriality as giving presumptive preference in cases of "longstanding relationships" to "the law of the place where that relationship is principally located." Id. at 319. 46. For clarity, I should perhaps point out that I am not arguing in favor of a formalistic federal rule permitting a forum court to give absolute priority to its own constitution over the l!lw of any other state in all cases. Formally, the people of a state are free to put anything they want into their constitution, but not everything is entitled to equal federal respect. A state cannot impose damage liability on the officials of sister states whenever they search its citizens in the other states, because due process limits the authority of the state to impose duties on unsuspecting nonresidents in other states. Nor can a state declare all fetuses in the country to be its citizens and protect them against abortions everywhere, for the same reason and also because federal law determines who counts as a citizen of the state for federal constitutional purposes.
47. See Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 885-86 & n.49 (accepting internal affairs doctrine for corporations). lar acts while neglecting the jurisdictional implications of the relationships among those involved in the acts.
The impression of neglect of relationships is reinforced by Professor Brilmayer's suggestions concerning guardians and the right to die. She concludes that, even in the absence of a federal right to die, a state cannot appoint a guardian for an incompetent patient and empower the guardian to move the patient from one hospital to another without also empowering the guardian to remove the patient to another state for the purpose of terminating the patient's life under the laws of that state. The preemptive effect of the other state's law makes the home state's limitations on the guardianship relation created under its laws a violation of the right to travel and an unconstitutional intrusion on the authority of the other state. Under this "preemption" analysis, the Constitution would not permit the home state to effectuate its concern that a guardian may abuse such ultimate powers over one of its citizens, 48 so long as the guardian could find some other state that was more trusting.
The use of geographical mobility to evade responsibilities that result from a relationship by leaving the jurisdiction where the relationship arose produces opportunities for some at the expense of damage to others. The federal government does not always accept such evasions in international conflicts, and the federal Constitution does not require the states simply to accept them in interstate conflicts.
To apply this reasoning to prohibition of abortion, one would have to characterize abortion as violating a relational responsibility. The relationship may be to the father of the fetus or to the fetus itself as a future citizen of the state. One need not go so far as to endorse extraterritorial regulation based on the state's relationship with the woman as one of its citizens. I agree with Professor Kreimer that, after the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Constitution leaves even less room for a Rousseauian conception of citizenship at the state level than at the federal level. Kreimer writes, however, as if regulation of abortion were a matter of the state's imposing regulation of morals in the absence of tangible harm, and a woman's subjection to such regulation were based on a generalized duty of obedience to law. In a post-Roe world, an antichoice state would justify its legislation as prevention of harm to persons or almost-persons who were entitled to its protection
